The future of the digital euro is approaching a decisive moment. In the first half of 2026, lawmakers in the European Parliament are expected to vote on the legislation that would allow the project to move from preparation to potential launch. Yet despite years of technical work by the European Central Bank, the political outcome remains uncertain.
Recent coverage from payments and crypto-focused outlets has highlighted the fragile state of parliamentary support. Centre-right and right-leaning MEPs remain sceptical, questioning whether a public digital currency would deliver tangible benefits for citizens or simply duplicate existing private payment solutions. Some have floated amendments that would sharply limit the project’s scope, for example by restricting early versions of the digital euro to offline or peer-to-peer use only.
Behind this political hesitation lies a broader concern about disruption. Critics argue that a retail CBDC could weaken commercial banks by encouraging deposit outflows or undermine Europe’s existing payments ecosystem. Supporters counter that the digital euro is primarily about resilience and sovereignty, reducing reliance on non-European card schemes and ensuring access to public money in an increasingly digital economy.
What Europeans Actually Think
While the political debate intensifies, new academic research paints a more nuanced picture of public behaviour. A recent ECB Research Bulletin No. 138, drawing on large-scale household surveys across major euro area countries, suggests that awareness of the digital euro has risen sharply, from single-digit levels in 2021 to around 40 percent by 2024.
More strikingly, roughly 45 percent of respondents said they would be likely to use a digital euro if it were available. Interest is strongest for everyday payments, both online and in shops, rather than for saving or investing. When asked how they would allocate a hypothetical €10,000 windfall, households devoted only a small share, around 5 percent, to digital euros, with most funds remaining in bank accounts or other assets.
These findings challenge a core fear among opponents. They suggest that, under normal conditions, a digital euro would behave much more like digital cash than a competing store of value. Even variations in hypothetical holding limits, ranging from €1,000 to €10,000, had little impact on how much households wanted to hold, indicating that caps may be less central to consumer behaviour than often assumed.
The research also underlines the importance of communication. Exposure to clear, official information about how the digital euro would work significantly increased willingness to adopt it. This supports the ECB’s long-standing argument that public scepticism is driven as much by misunderstanding as by opposition in principle.
Politics Versus Evidence
The contrast between political uncertainty and emerging empirical evidence is becoming harder to ignore. On one side, lawmakers remain divided, wary of approving a project that could be portrayed as risky or unnecessary. On the other, consumer data increasingly suggests that adoption would likely be moderate, payment-focused, and unlikely to destabilise banks.
This gap helps explain why the upcoming vote has become so pivotal. A rejection or heavy watering-down of the legislation would not reflect a lack of technical readiness, but rather a failure to align political narratives with observed household behaviour. Conversely, approval would give the ECB a mandate to proceed cautiously, with design choices that reflect how Europeans actually use money.
For Europe, the decision goes beyond payments technology. It is a test of whether the EU can translate long-term strategic goals, such as monetary sovereignty and financial resilience, into policy, even when the immediate political incentives are weak.
As the vote approaches, the digital euro is no longer just a technical project. It is a political judgement on whether evidence about citizens’ preferences is strong enough to overcome fear of the unknown