A group of US Republican senators has renewed efforts to block the Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency, reviving a debate that stands in stark contrast to how the digital euro is being designed and discussed in Europe. The move matters beyond Washington because it highlights fundamentally different political assumptions about state-issued digital money on either side of the Atlantic.
In a press release dated 12 January 2026, Jon Husted announced his support for the Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act, legislation that would prohibit the Federal Reserve from issuing a retail digital dollar. The bill is led by Ted Cruz and co-sponsored by several Republican senators.
At the heart of the US argument is the claim that a CBDC would enable government surveillance of citizens’ spending. Husted said the Federal Reserve “has no business monitoring the transactions of Ohioans or any other law-abiding American,” while Cruz described a CBDC as a threat to financial freedom, innovation and privacy. Other sponsors warned that a digital dollar could turn the Fed into a retail bank and expand its role without explicit congressional approval.
The rhetoric is notable for how little it engages with technical design questions. Rather than debating safeguards, intermediated models or limits on holdings, the statements frame CBDCs as inherently dangerous. Several senators explicitly referenced China, arguing that a digital currency could be used to monitor or control citizens’ economic behaviour.
Banking groups line up against a digital dollar
The bill has attracted support from influential industry groups, including the American Bankers Association and the Independent Community Bankers of America. Both organisations warned that a Federal Reserve-issued CBDC could disintermediate banks, reduce credit availability and alter the balance of the US financial system.
For US banks, the concern is structural rather than technical. A retail CBDC issued directly by the central bank is seen as a potential competitor to deposits, particularly in times of stress. That fear has been a constant theme in American CBDC debates, even as the Federal Reserve itself has repeatedly said it would not issue a digital dollar without congressional authorization.
Why this matters for Europe
From a euro area perspective, the US debate illustrates how political framing can shape CBDC outcomes as much as technology. The European Central Bank has consistently emphasised that the digital euro would be distributed through supervised intermediaries, not directly by the central bank, and would include strict privacy protections and holding limits. In Europe, the question is how to design a digital euro safely. In the US debate reflected here, the question is whether a retail CBDC should exist at all.
The contrast matters because the euro and the dollar underpin much of the global financial system. Divergent approaches to public digital money could affect cross-border payments, standards-setting and the future balance between public and private forms of digital cash. As Europe moves deeper into legislative negotiations on the digital euro, US opposition hardening along ideological lines may further widen the transatlantic gap.
